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ESSAY
RENDER UNTO CAESAR: AN ESSAY ON PRIVATE




Growing up in Little Rock in the 1950s, it would not have oc-
curred to me to separate religion and morality from political and
legal issues. When my father, in those days an Eisenhower Republi-
can and businessman, gave lectures on the philosophical roots of
communism, he gave them primarily to church groups. And it was
at our church several years later that a group of young people met to
call for the integrated reopening of Little Rock's high schools, which
had been closed by a Faubus-sponsored referendum.
Certainly, as the McCarthy and Faubus eras proved, ethical
considerations should be on any agenda for the discussion of public
policy. However, it is one thing to seek to structure government and
politics upon rather broad, generalized moral principles. It is quite
another to imbed into the law specific religious dogma, dealing with
personal behavior or belief.'
B. The General Issue
At issue is the appropriate function of the law in regulating pri-
vate behavior, an issue brought sharply into focus by current de-
bates in the political arena. Congress, state legislatures, and city
councils have to grapple regularly with the recurring phenomena of
pornography (adult and child), strip joints, dirty movies, and drug
abuse.2 Such public issues have to be confronted and legislative
* B.A. Hendrix College, 1964; L.L.B. Duke University, 1967. Partner, Mitchell, Wil-
liams, & Selig, Little Rock.
1. See, e.g., 1981 Ark. Acts 590; interview with Senator Jim Hoisted, sponsor of Act
590, Arkansas Gazette, Mar. 22, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
2. See 1981 Ark. Acts 887 (revising Arkansas' obscenity law and increasing penalties)
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bodies must make judgments which inevitably reflect their collective
moral attitudes.
However, there are also presently circulating proposals for re-
versing (directly or indirectly) the substance of the United States
Supreme Court's decisions on abortion, school prayer, and related
issues dealing with behavior that is essentially personal.' It has been
said in some quarters that these changes, particularly the proposed
constitutional amendments, represent a radical departure from
American tradition.4 In reply, it is argued that social legislation,
plainly on the upswing since the New Deal, is in fact a type of
''moral" legislation and that current trends simply substitute one
view of "morality" for another.5
C. The Ultimate Questions
This controversy raises significant questions, both legal and
political, several of which may be disposed of before proceeding to
the central issues. The following questions frame the ultimate issues
to be addressed by this essay:
1. Has there been a trend toward "moral legislation" which is
more closely identifiable with liberal political thought, especialy
legislation mandating transfer payments of various sorts and in-
creased government regulation of economic activity? If so, is such a
trend a departure from the traditional American functions of the
law?
2. Do current proposals seeking to alter court decisions on
such matters as abortion, school prayer, and sexual behavior repre-
sent a departure from the traditional American functions of the
law?
3. Are there fundamental, non-political differences between
the types of enactments contemplated by the first question and those
contemplated by the second question?
4. Are there objective tools with which legislation in either
category may be analyzed to determine whether it conforms to the
traditional American functions of the law?
and 1981 Ark. Acts 870 (defining obscene materials, prohibiting their distribution, and pre-
scribing penalties for violations).
3. See Efforts to Restrain Federal Courts in Contro'ersial Matters Continue, Vol. 17,
No. 10 ABA Wash. Letter 4 (Oct. 1, 1981) and Kalb, The Proposed Human Life Statute.-
Abortion as Murder? 67 A.B.A.J. 1123 (1981).
4. See Abortion, Politics and Tolerance, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1980, § E (The Week in
Review) at 16.
5. See Batesville Guard, Jan. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 1, (interview with the Rev. Jim Brown,
an incorporator of the Arkansas chapter of Moral Majority).
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D. Politics as Usual?
As noted, it will be argued that these are simply political issues,
but, while partially political, these issues are not exclusively a matter
of political judgment. Reasonable people may certainly disagree,
for example, on public policy concerning the strictness of environ-
mental controls (or even on whether there should be such controls);
on regulation of nuclear power; and on similar issues.6 These four
questions ask whether there have been any basic changes in our
view of the structure of policy making and the process by which we
deal with these issues, through the law.
With regard to the first of the four questions, it would appear
beyond serious argument that there has been an increasing trend
toward certain types of transfer payments (that is, funds collected by
government from one segment of the population and awarded by it
to another segment), and a higher degree of business regulation.
Such transfer payments, however, do not ordinarily involve compul-
sion with reference to personal behavior, and they are indeed an
established feature of the American political system, as this essay
will attempt to establish. Similarly, business regulation only periph-
erally touches personal behavior.
Legislation which regulates strictly personal behavior likewise
is not new to the American political/legal system, although it ap-
pears to have been on the decline until recently. Its reintroduction,
would, hence, represent a departure from the trend of American
law. This element of personal compulsion would appear to distin-
guish the first two types of legislation (transfer payments and eco-
nomic behavior legislation) from the third (personal behavior
legislation).
It is this distinction which provides the major focus of this dis-
cussion; which establishes a fundamental, non-political difference
between these contrasting types of legislation; and which provides
the principal analytical tool for judging both categories.
Again, the issues may be primarily political and philosophical,
and perhaps only secondarily legal. But since our central focus is
the proper function of the law itself, a clearer examination of the
legal aspects of moral legislation may make the political and philo-
sophical issues more susceptible to reasoned debate.
6. For a succinct listing of especially non-traditional positions on some of these issues,
put forth by Ed Clark, Libertarian candidate for President in 1980, see The Candidate Who




The question of the appropriate function of the law in regulat-
ing personal behavior is hardly new. Dean Roscoe Pound observed
the inherent conflict early in this century:
[W]hen men demand little of law and enforcement of law is but
enforcement of the ethical minimum necessary for the orderly
conduct of society, enforcement of law involves few difficulties.
All but the inevitable antisocial residue can understand the sim-
ple program and obvious purposes of such a legal system, and
enforcement requires nothing more than a strong and reasonably
stable political organization. On the other hand, when men de-
mand much of law, when they seek to make it do the work of the
home and of the church, enforcement of law comes to involve
many difficulties . .. .
The phenomenon, according to Pound, also touches lawyers:
The purposes of the legal system are not all upon the surface, and
it may be that many whose nature is by no means antisocial are
out of accord with some or even with many of these purposes.
Hence today, in the wake of ambitious social programs calling
for more and more interference with every relation of life, dissat-
isfaction with law, criticism of legal and judicial institutions, and
suspicion as to the purposes of the lawyer become universal.8
Dean Pound's observations give a broad outline of the general dis-
tinction contemplated by this essay.
II. BASIC PREMISES
In framing the issues, this essay proceeds on two basic, interre-
lated premises about the nature and traditional American function
of the law:
1. The purpose of the law is not to insure universal morality
(however perceived) or even universa/justice in a substantive sense,
but rather to identiy' and enhance mechanismsfor allowing society
tofunction in a manner which is satisfactory to its members.'
2. Even at Dean Pound's "ethical minimum, " the law restricts
some individualfreedom to structure our behavior as we please, but
7. Pound, The Limits of Effective LegalAction, 3 A.B.A.J. 55 (1917).
8. Id at 55-56.
9. See L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER (1981). Mr. Fuller uses the




our system presupposes a bias in favor of maximum personalfree-
dom, consistent with the purpose set forth in the first premise.
The idea that laws are not expected to guarantee morality in a
religious sense is not new. One of the basic thrusts of St. Augus-
tine's The City of God is that man cannot hope to structure earthly
governance in imitation of the celestial order. Rather, St. Augustine
argued, man is presumptuous in trying, and he should structure gov-
ernment so as not to interfere with the relationship between the indi-
vidual and God.'°
Similarly, our constitutional system of government grew out of
the same intellectual climate that produced John Locke and his the-
ory of the social contract. Locke saw no divine order in the lives
and governments of men, but merely a system whereby the affected
individuals mutually agreed upon a system for furthering their own
common temporal interests." This same element of agreement is
reflected in historical definitions of the state.'2
As Pound noted, once a society progresses past simple anarchy,
restrictions on individual freedom are in large part matters of degree
since government of any sort restricts individual freedom. However,
as he also contemplates, matters of degree are important. Obvi-
ously, there are fundamental differences between the daily lives of
citizens living under a system of regulated capitalism and those liv-
ing under democratic socialism; there are even more profound dif-
ferences between either of these two systems and both communism
as it exists today and military dictatorships.
Further, our basic governmental documents have concentrated
both on prohibitions against governmental interference with indi-
vidual rights and the affirmative granting of rights. The first fifteen
amendments to the United States Constitution either grant affirma-
tive rights or prohibit the government from doing certain things.
Only the thirteenth amendment contains a limitation on individual
freedom, but the restriction on owning slaves is in essence an affirm-
ative grant of freedom from slavery.
The remaining amendments are by and large housekeeping or
mechanical enactments. The single amendment which represented
10. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 427-82 (1958).
11. J. GARRATY & P. GAY, THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF THE WORLD 595-96 (1972).
12. For example, Cicero stated, "A people is a gathering of those united by agreement
on the right and by shared interests." To St. Augustine, "A people is a gathering of many
rational individuals united by accord on loved things held in common." Both are quoted in
G. WILLS, CONFESSIONS OF A CONSERVATIVE 194 (1980).
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a restriction of personal freedom, the eighteenth amendment man-
dating prohibition with reference to intoxicating liquors, had to be
rescinded.
Viewed from this perspective, voting rights legislation and the
proposed Equal Rights Amendment, both of which arose in a con-
text of moral reform, appear to be consistent with these basic prem-
ises, and hence, should not be considered as "moral" legislation.
Voting rights legislation specifically relates to a basic right of citi-
zenship, the very essence of representative government. Similarly,
the Equal Rights Amendment has a limited focus: Governmental
action, or legislation enacted and enforced by government. Personal
behavior is simply outside its scope. its proponents may hope that it
would also affect attitudes in a symbolic manner, but such a result
involves no governmental compulsion.
What these basic premises require, then, is the disassociation of
legislation from both its political trappings and social preconcep-
tions so that the basic structure and function of the law can be
evaluated.
III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE LAW
Within the present American legal structure, legislation tends
to fall into identifiable categories. (For the purposes of this essay,
the terms "legislation" and "law" comprehend legislative acts, regu-
lations, constitutional provisions and even court decisions-in short,
all types of governmental dictates of whatever source.)
The categories suggested here are very rough and perhaps arbi-
trary. Obviously, some legislation will fall into more than one cate-
gory, and some categories will overlap. The categories were devised
simply to provide some conceptual framework for the task at hand.
Our major purpose is to isolate the areas which have generated
those clashes over the appropriate functions of the law with which
this essay is concerned-first, to identify classes of legislation where
there has been no significant departure from traditional uses of the
law and hence no conflict concerning the functions of the law; and,
second, to identify those areas where this conflict exists or may arise.
For these purposes, five types of laws can be identified:
1. INDIVIDUAL HARM-Laws which regulate or proscribe
certain behavior which is apt to cause harm to an identfiable victim
in a medically or economically recognizable manner. This cate-
gory includes, among others, criminal laws prohibiting interfer-
ence with the person; laws which define and proscribe offenses
[Vol. 4:511516
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against property; laws which regulate economic activity deemed
harmful; and laws prohibiting actions with a potential for harm,
such as speeding and careless driving.
2. GROUP HARM-Laws which regulate orproscribe cer-
tain behavior with regard to an identifiable group of individual vic-
tims of medically or economically recognizable harms.
Representative laws in this category include pollution control
laws; food and drug laws; land use control laws; prohibitions
against theft of public funds; and prohibitions against engaging
in certain occupations and professions without a governmental
certification.
3. SOCIETAL BENEFIT-Laws which promote, subsidize,
or direct benefit individuals or groups. This category encom-
passes transfer payments of all types, including welfare benefits,
social security, GI education benefits, and government loan guar-
antees. This category could also include tax deductions for
churches or charities; governmental decisions to provide sex edu-
cation in the schools; warnings on cigarette packages; compulsory
school integration; and the allowance of systems for private taxa-
tion such as improvement districts.
4. SOCIETAL HARM-Laws which regulate or proscribe
certain behavior toprotect society as a whole, remote individual vic-
tims, or even the perpetrator of the action. These laws encompass
regulation of the use of alcohol and drugs, gambling, sexual be-
havior, abortions, flag salutation, and school prayer. These types
of enactments should perhaps be considered in conjunction with
their counterparts such as laws prohibiting discrimination against
homosexuals or other groups in employment.
5. HOUSEKEEPING-Laws deining rights or procedures
without significant governmental sanctions. Included are the Uni-
form Commercial Code, the statute of frauds, the Uniform Part-
nership Act, the Corporation Code and other business legislation,
and many of the laws dealing with marriage and divorce.
Within these categories, the delineation between areas of con-
flict and non-conflict concerning the functions of law is less than
razor-sharp, but the distinction is useable. Its utility requires a thor-
ough examination of areas where there are no fundamental disputes
about the proper function of the law, even when appearances indi-
cate otherwise. Specifically, it is necessary to distinguish conflicts
which are the result of unexceptional differences over policy or
which occur in areas which require continuing debate, reevaluation
and revision on the one hand from basic conflicts on the other hand.
By way of illustration, consider that the political decision about
1981] 517
UALR LAW JOURNAL
whether capital punishment should be retained is not in itself re-
garded by this essay as a question of moral legislation at all, al-
though collateral issues associated with it may be instructive.
IV. AREAS WITHOUT FUNDAMENTAL CONFLICT
A. Individual Harm Legislation
In the area of physical or economic harm to individuals, con-
troversy has remained within a fairly narrow range. Changes have
been more in the nature of adjustments, rather than fundamental
changes of direction. For example, the comprehensive revision of
the Arkansas Criminal Code in 1975 was essentially a clean-up pro-
cedure, with no significant changes, additions, or deletions when a
victim was actually involved. Later amendments have also tended
to be adjustments rather than drastic alterations. 3 There has been
very little criminalization of behavior which was not previously clas-
sified as criminal.
If anything, there have been some minor adjustments in the op-
posite direction. Heterosexual behavior of all types between con-
senting adults basically has been decriminalized, although
homosexual behavior remains a misdemeanor.' 4 While chapter 24
of the Code sets forth a number of "offenses against the family,"
adultery and fornication are no longer criminal offenses.15 Simi-
larly, possession of marijuana for personal use has been differenti-
ated from possession for resale, the distinction turning on the
amount possessed.16
The process is one the electorate seems to prefer-that is,
whether it seems right that a certain act should be considered crimi-
nal, and whether people are generally comfortable with the punish-
ment dictated for that particular infraction.' 7
13. See, e.g., 1981 Ark. Acts 816 (increasing penalty for engaging in prostitution).
14. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1977).
15. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2401 to -2471 (1977).
16. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2617(1)(d) (1976).
17. This process may also manifest itself through the system of setting sentences by jury
rather than through the trial judge (although the vast majority of defendants in Arkansas are
sentenced from the bench). A retired judge who had previously served as a deputy prosecu-
tor recalled in a private interview in April, 1981, that his office had had extreme difficulty
with a particular sexual offense. Juries simply would not convict persons charged because of
the relatively substantial prison term. When the legislature reduced the term, the number of
convictions rose significantly on substantially similar evidence. He also noted that juries,
during their deliberations, would frequently ask the court what the penalties were for a




The relative morality of the death penalty has aroused substan-
tial controversy. 8 The most important discussion has centered
upon the efficiency of capital punishment and whether it actually
works as a deterrent. Studies indicate that there is no discernible
relationship between capital punishment and deterrence.' 9
The imposition of the sentence is usually so far removed from
the actual commission of the crime as to vastly blunt its impact.
Moreover, the public is reluctant to impose such a sentence
perfunctorially. As in Furman v. Georgia,2" the United States
Supreme Court has insisted upon strict procedural guidelines, a
view which probably corresponds to public attitudes. The Court has
even flirted with the notion that capital punishment constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment2' which is prohibited by the United States
Constitution-a conclusion already reached by the Massachusetts
Supreme Court.2 2
Capital punishment itself, however, is, strictly speaking, irrele-
vant to the present discussion. It comes into play only after behav-
ior has occurred and concerns how that behavior is punished, not
whether the behavior being punished is proscribed by the law. Yet,
an examination of capital punishment does serve to bring into focus
the differences between the functional and the "moral" approach to
the law.
Unquestionably, one of the purposes of punishment is to mete
out retribution which satisfies an apparent emotional need of the
public.23 No functional system can totally ignore such needs. And
we do seem to believe collectively that certain acts are so reprehensi-
ble that only the ultimate punishment is appropriate. Yet we are so
uncomfortable with carrying out the sentence that we hem its use
with safeguards that render it virtually meaningless as a deterrent
(aside from the obvious elimination of the condemned as a possible
future perpetrator of crimes).
Although prosecutors may publicly call for an extension of the
death penalty to cover more situations, some have privately admit-
18. Most recently, see Mailer, Until Dead- Thoughts on Capital Punishment, PARADE
February 8, 1981, at 6.
19. See, e.g., Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions,
1967 Wis. L. REV. 703, 706 (1967); Schwartz & Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHi. L.
REV. 275, 278 (1967).
20. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
21. Id at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring).
22. District Attorney v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980).
23. Mailer, supra note 18.
51919811
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ted that the enormous procedural safeguards which necessarily at-
tend the imposition of the death sentence actually have a negative
impact. Pursuing the appeals, retrials, and other procedures con-
sumes an enormous amount of prosecutorial time which could be
applied elsewhere more productively to reduce crime.24
Thus, though capital punishment does not appear to fulfill its
purpose, we cling to it for reasons unrelated to its efficacy as a deter-
rent. Although a general view of the Arkansas Criminal Code
reveals a functional, common-sense approach to crime, any serious
observer would have to conclude that in the area of capital punish-
ment, the law has never become completely functional.
It is in straying from a strictly functional approach that moral
legislation causes the most problems.
B. Group Harm Legislation
There also appears to be no radical societal schism on legisla-
tion pertaining to group harm such as pollution control laws. The
differences seem to be primarily in degree. Public awareness has
grown as our exposure to pollution has increased. For example, pol-
lution control efforts began primarily with the control of water pol-
lution as the use of sewage facilities became more universal in the
late 1940s and the industrial pollution of water resources became
more visible.
Air pollution received attention in the 1960s, and was perhaps
the primary motivating force behind the creation of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency by executive order of the President in
1970.25 The Clean Air Act2 6 has been the focus of much environ-
mental debate for the last ten years, and is presently before Con-
gress for renewal.
As America became increasingly urbanized in the 1970s, the
need for adequate disposal of solid wastes resulted in solid waste
legislation. The overwhelming majority of municipalities appar-
ently recognize their responsibility in this regard, even if resources
for dealing with the problem have varied widely from community to
community.
Finally, incidents such as the Love Canal disaster have height-
ened our awareness of the dangers of hazardous waste. The chemi-
24. Private interview with former chief deputy prosecuting attorney, Pulaski County,
Arkansas, September, 1975.
25. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1972 (1970).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 to -1858(a) (1976).
[Vol. 4:511
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cal industry may disagree about the seriousness of the problem, but
virtually everyone agrees that something must be done.21
Other societies have experimented with emission fees and
charges, but American government and even industry have em-
braced the regulatory approach. For example, the regulatory ap-
proach to air pollution involves a value judgment that pollution is
improper and should be limited or prohibited. This contrasts to the
Japanese view that the pollution problem is essentially a matter of
economics and cost shifting.28 Even American industry has been
unwilling to adopt this value-neutral approach.
Hence, the controversy over the environment has largely re-
mained one of degree and mechanics rather than differences in basic
values, despite the fact that the regulatory approach to emission
controls plainly involves limitations on behavior and elements of
economic compulsion.
With some notable exceptions, virtually every major American
municipality exercises land use controls, primarily through zoning.
Such controls limit individual freedom to use land in order to pro-
vide for the greater good. Sign ordinances are perhaps an extreme
example since their ostensible purpose is to promote the economic
well-being of their communities. 29 However, it is possible to con-
clude that a substantial factor in their enactment has been simple
esthetics-not even mild moral preferences-rather than
economics.3 °
It is easy enough to argue that Americans, collectively and indi-
vidually, are over-regulated. However, the idea of regulation itself
is widely accepted even in the business community where some sec-
tors insist that it is essential.3'
Minimum wage laws and antitrust laws have been attacked as
unnecessary and economically counter-productive. 32 They do, how-
ever, impact almost exclusively on an economic basis and do not
impinge on personal behavior. This distinction is critical.
27. Alexander, The Hazardous- Waste Nightmare, 101 FORTUNE 52 (April 21, 1980).
28. Gresser, The 1973 Japanese Lawfor the Compensation of Pollution-Related Health
Damage.- An Introductory Assessment, 8 L. IN JAPAN 92 (1975).
29. See, e.g., Little Rock, Ark., Code § 44-1 (1961).
30. See, e.g., Osage Oil & Transp., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 260 Ark. 448, 541 S.W.2d
922 (1976).
31. Alexander, Day ofReckoningfor Oil Refiers, 103 FORTUNE 38 (January 12, 1981);
Loving, The Railroads' Bad Trip to Deregulation, 102 FORTUNE 44 (August 25, 1980).




C. Societal Benefit Legislation
Laws prohibiting racial and sexual discrimination in employ-
ment and in housing are closer questions in that, to a large degree,
they are intended to overcome personal prejudices. (Even in an eco-
nomic context individuals have been known to act in ways that are
counter to their own self interests. Contrary to traditional Marxist
dogma, human beings are not solely economic entities but are rather
complex combinations of judgments concerning not only economic
matters, but moral, esthetic, and other intricate emotional
configurations.)
Yet, the basic focus of such legislation is not personal, but eco-
nomic, a distinction recognized in the legislation itself. Specifically,
when employment units are so small as to be personal endeavors,
equal employment strictures do not apply.33 When a rental unit is
so small that its occupancy by the owner makes it more personal
than commercial, the hypothetical Mrs. Murphy may be more
choosey as to her renters.34
Part of the justification for this approach may be that the exclu-
sions do not significantly dilute the remedy. Certainly, the exclu-
sions were part of a political compromise to gain passage of the
legislation. The essence of the compromise, however, was to distin-
guish economic behavior, thought to be a proper subject for govern-
mental supervision,35 from personal behavior, regulation of which
requires greater circumspection.
This area may also illustrate another distinction between the
traditional liberal social agenda and current "moral" legislation. If
the act of discrimination were viewed solely in an ethical or moral
context, Mrs. Murphy's actions would be as reprehensible as those
of a large corporate property owner, and compromise would be
back-sliding. However, compromise is possible because such moral
judgments are avoided. After all, there has been virtually no signifi-
cant effort to remove these exclusions. Proceeding from a moral
base makes difficult, if not impossible, the sort of balance and com-
promise which are central features of the American political
36experience.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1976).
35. Ball & Friedman, Legal Regulation, Business Conduct and Prevailing Morality, in The
Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement o/Economic Legislation: A Sociological View,
17 STAN. L. REV. 197 (1965).
36. G. WILLS, CONFESSIONS OF A CONSERVATIVE 201-02 (1980).
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This is not to say that anti-discrimination legislation has itself
remained wholly functional. For example, it is entirely possible
when proceeding through both the administrative and litigation
phases of an EEOC case to spend a great deal more than is at issue
in terms of eventual monetary benefit to the claimant. 37 The pur-
pose may be to deter future discrimination, but it at least arguably
involves a desire to punish the alleged perpetrator and vindicate the
moral right as much as to protect the economic right.
In terms of economic needs, it may well be more functional to
view discrimination simply as a tort, with attorney's fees and multi-
ple damages as incentives, leaving the area to the private economic
judgment of claimants and lawyers. Nevertheless, the existing rights
and remedies are essentially economic rather than personal in
nature.
D. Housekeeping Legislation
Some housekeeping legislation has overtones of religion and
morality. Even in those instances where moral traces are evident,
however, the functions of the state can be winnowed out from other
values. Marriage, for example, would probably have been invented
by the state even if it had no religious significance. Generally, mar-
riage recognizes the dependency of children, the usual economic de-
pendency of the child-bearing member of the partnership, and the
need to ascribe paternity for purposes primarily relating to support.
(Arkansas law has never specifically dictated that a wife bear
the name of the husband, or for that matter that the children bear
the name of their father. When he was attorney general, Jim Guy
Tucker issued an opinion that married and divorced women had
quite a bit of latitude in their choice of names, absent a fraudulent
purpose.38 Arkansas statutes have long allowed divorced women
without children to be restored to their maiden names, 39 although
many have taken them back without benefit of court order. Now
this right has been extended to divorced women with children.
4 0
However, the wife's taking a husband's name and giving that name
to the children has the completely secular purpose of establishing
that he is in fact the father of children borne by that woman during
the term of their relationship legally recognized as marriage; hence,
37. Interviews with private EEOC defense practitioners, Little Rock, November, 1980.
38. Opinion No. 74-55, to Senator Morriss H. Henry, April 19, 1974.
39. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1216 (1962).
40. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1216 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
1981]
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he is obligated to participate in their support. The incidence of de-
pendency on public resources for support is thereby reduced, serv-
ing a highly functional rather than moral purpose.)
Married and unmarried persons alike complain that the tax
laws and government regulations discriminate against them. How-
ever, the Markham case notwithstanding,41 it is difficult to say that
government does much to either encourage or discourage marriage
as opposed to cohabitation. One function of the law is simply to
lend certainty to people's dealings with one another. The Lee Mar-
vin case42 underlines the hazards of uncertainty.43
Then too, if Desmond Morris' theories on pairbonding and the
nurturing of human young are correct, there are identifiable societal
values in preserving a long term monogamous relationship."4
Again, these notions are generally not dependent upon giving any
religious significance to marriage.
The converse is equally true: Religious institutions do not need
the sanctions of the state to preserve the religious significance of
marriage. For example, many young people who have purely civil
marriage ceremonies feel the need to have a religious ceremony at a
later time in order to feel "really married."
The point is that most of our laws have no religious or moral
bias one way or another. Thus, few fundamental confficts arise over
the functions of the law as it relates to individual harm, group harm,
housekeeping, and even much "social" legislation. The problems
and the potential for conffict must, therefore, lie elsewhere.
V. AREAS OF CONFLICT: SOCIETAL BENEFIT AND
SOCIETAL HARM LEGISLATION
A. Societal Benfits. Transfer Payments
Legislation promoting or subsidizing a particular activity is
nothing new. The United States has utilized transfer payments for
stated social purposes almost since the inception of the republic.
41. Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979), holding
that the Equal Credit Opportunity Act grants unmarried couples the right to demand that
their incomes be aggregated when a lender determines their credit worthiness in a joint
mortgage application, as opposed to being considered separately-in other words, the right
to avoid discrimination in favor of married couples similarly situated.
42. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3rd 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
43. A bill was introduced in the 73rd General Assembly of the State of Arkansas, 1981,
which would have prescribed guidelines for written contracts in contemplation of cohabita-
tion. It was referred to an interim committee.
44. D. MORRIS, THE NAKED APE (1967). See especially chapters 2 and 3.
[Vol. 4:5 11
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The railroads were given every other section abutting the path
of the right-of-way to induce them to bind the country together by
rails. The millions of acres awarded in this manner were the prop-
erty of the collective citizenry of the United States (or of the Indians,
depending upon how you look at it).
The motivation for the GI bill and other veterans benefit legis-
lation45 may have been in part to reward men who had sacrificed for
their country. The overriding social purpose of the educational
grants, however, was to provide a means for integrating these people
back into the American economic system, allowing them to make up
for lost time. Additionally, this approach singled out for college ed-
ucation a group of persons (albeit exclusively male) which could be
expected to be more highly motivated and mature in their attitudes
toward school.
Low interest rate loans are available to colleges of all sorts, in-
cluding church-related colleges, 46 in part to strengthen private edu-
cation. Hill-Burton and similiar funds have been made available to
build or expand hospitals, many of which have religious ties.47
Tax deductions for church donations are also a form of transfer
payment. Depending on the tax bracket of the contributor, the fed-
eral treasury foregoes collection of a percentage of every dollar
donated to a church or charity.48 The loss in funds must be made up
somewhere, resulting in at least slightly higher overall tax rates and
thus spreading a part of each donation over the entire citizenry.
The justification has been that churches perform essential func-
tions which would otherwise have to be performed by government.49
Also, in a more general sense, institutions such as churches are pre-
sumed to lend stability to society, thereby making the job of govern-
ment easier and less expensive. Thus, according to theory, the mass
of taxpayers whose rates are raised slightly because of charitable
deductions are actually preventing their taxes from being substan-
tially higher still.
In a sense, transfer payments to indigents involve the same ra-
tionale. For example, aid for dependent children and food stamps
are intended to reduce the incidence of malnutrition, with its result-
45. See generaly Title 38, specifically educational benefits at 38 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1799
(1976).
46. 20 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1976).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1976).
48. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976).
49. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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ing brain damage and other harmful effects.50 Thus, the theory
goes, children benefited by these programs will not become perma-
nent wards of the state.5'
Of course, many persons would applaud the entire range of
transfer payments to the poor as morally justified, wholly apart from
the functional aspects of such a system. Others would condemn the
system as encouraging shiftlessness and promiscuity, particularly
with reference to aid to unwed mothers. More serious critics of the
system suggest that an approach which discourages initiative and
encourages dependency, without addressing the causes of the condi-
tions necessitating the payments, is in itself harmful.52
It may also be argued that such a system in fact compels its
constituents to accept a state of dependency by penalizing those who
choose to leave the system and by making work only marginally
more rewarding.
5 3
Legislative drafters and executives cannot ignore such criticism.
If this is compulsion, however, many governmental activities adopt
the same approach. For example, an import duty on Japanese
automobiles which raises their price to an American purchaser es-
sentially penalizes that buyer if he chooses to purchase such an
automobile.
This is a far different matter fromprohibiting the purchase alto-
gether, or compelling the purchase of a domestic automotive product
in some manner. These are the types of compulsion which this essay
addresses, particularly when backed by a criminal sanction or tangi-
ble penalty.
Even without aspects of compulsion, transfer payments obvi-
ously can have significant social and economic side effects which
reach beyond their impact on indigent individuals. Social security
payments which substantially exceed amounts paid in by the recipi-
ents during their working years may shift buying power dramati-
cally. They may also encourage early retirement, which may in turn
accelerate upward mobility of younger workers. Food stamps may
actually increase the purchase of agricultural products.
Nevertheless, although transfer payments can have a profound
50. Private interview with Little Rock physician researching malnutrition on NIH
grant.
51. The same point of simple cost effectiveness was applied to childhood immunization
programs in a speech by U.S. Senator Dale Bumpers to the state convention of the Arkansas
League of Women Voters, Conway, Arkansas, April 11, 1981.
52. See, e.g., N. FRIEDMAN & D. ROSE, FREE To CHOOSE 96 (1980).
53. Id at 107.
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social and economic impact, and obviously generate substantial dif-
ferences in political opinion, they do not represent a significant de-
parture from past practice. Transfer payments by and large simply
do not involve any significant element of compulsion beyond the ex-
traction of the tax and perhaps some minor features such as requir-
ing merchants to accept food stamps.
B. Societal Benefits: Compulsion and Compromise
"Societal benefit" legislation takes on an entirely different hue
when the element of genuine compulsion is added to it. For exam-
ple, compulsory school attendance has been justified judicially.1
4
However, it unquestionably involves a significant narrowing of the
freedom of choice for parents and students, especially with regard to
curriculum and teaching methods.55 Brown v. Board of Education
5 6
and subsequent cases involve restoring a constitutional right and re-
dressing a wrong. However, unless one accepts some notion of in-
herited guilt, transportation to achieve integration obviously
involves persons only remotely connected to the original decisions
which created segregated housing patterns and non-unitary school
systems, many of which decisions were not wholly governmental.
Transportation of students simply emphasizes the fact that par-
ticipation in compulsory education itself involves compulsion for
larger social purposes. One of these purposes may reflect a decision
that social, economic and racial heterogeneity is a desirable educa-
tional experience, whether or not constitutional remedies are
involved.
Similarly, although it is difficult to argue with the need for sex
education in a state having the nation's highest venereal disease and
teenage pregnancy rates, sex is obviously not like trigonometry or
industrial arts. Algebra involves no personal judgments. Sex edu-
cation as a part of compulsory school attendance plainly involves a
collective judgment that such training is a value to society; hence,
the compulsion is deemed justified.
The reasoning of Griswold v. Connecticut 7 could very easily be
utilized to support the proposition that children, through their par-
54. See general Goodwin v. Cross County School Dist. No. 7, 394 F. Supp. 417 (E.D.
Ark. 1973).
55. See Pegale v. Levison, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E,2d 213 (1950), which required a curricu-
lum substantially equivalent to that of the public schools in order for attendance at a private
school to satisfy the Illinois compulsory school attendance law.
56. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
57. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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ents, should be-able to opt out of such classes. The temptation is to
analogize the situation to school prayer. However, the "chilling"
effect in the school prayer cases58 involves the specific constitutional
prohibition against establishment of religion, whereas the extended
right to privacy is a generalized right that could be more easily
protected.
It is also possible to argue that, as with marriage, the purposes
of the state and of the church can be separated with reference to sex
education. The state can teach on a purely mechanical basis, in-
structing children how to avoid disease and pregnancy. The re-
sponse, of course, is that abstention avoids both problems.59 In this
area, separability without an opt-out provision would seem almost
impossible to achieve.
Perhaps reversing the situation, blue laws have been justified by
a societal need for a "day of rest."'60 However, the "day of rest" is
imposed on buyers and sellers whether they want it or not. The
element of compulsion is obvious to anyone who has ever tried to
purchase a screwdriver in Arkansas on Sunday afternoon. The sep-
arability is also obvious. Those who wish to observe a day of rest
(whether it is Saturday or Sunday) may do so on a voluntary basis,
without the state imposing the choice of that day on society gener-
ally. Certainly no serious religious practitioner would claim that the
sabbath is any less holy because others carry on some limited com-
mercial activity.
C. Societal Harm." Historical Precedents
We have in the past undertaken to regulate private behavior on
a vast scale. The most obvious historical example is the prohibition
against the manufacture and consumption of alcoholic beverages. 6'
Prohibition may seem so distant in time and such an obvious failure
that there is nothing to be gained from reconsidering it.
However, one lesson from the prohibition experience is very
plain: Attempting to impose a control on personal behavior which
lacks or fails to maintain widespread popular support is highly cost-
ineffective. It takes a substantial amount of time, effort, and other
58. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
59. Brochure distributed by F.L.A.G.
60. Broad-Grace Arcade Corp. v. Bright, 284 U.S. 588 (1931).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
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resources to police such legislation. As law enforcement resources
are necessarily finite, one must question this type of effort.
In terms of popular support, it is also well to remember that
even persons who are abstemious apparently vote in substantial
numbers to legalize the public sale of liquor, even by the drink, pre-
sumably because they are reluctant to impose their own personal
habits on others.
Of course, there are substantial legal controls over the sale and
consumption of alcoholic beverages, principally laws prohibiting
sales to minors, laws against driving while intoxicated, and laws
against public drunkenness.62 Laws relating to minority are so
widespread and have such obvious purposes that there is no real
need to devote much discussion to them. The latter two categories,
however, are significant because they deal with the misuse of alcohol
as it poses a danger of injury to third persons.
In some ways laws relating to public drunkenness and alcohol
addiction retain vestiges of the prohibition mentality.63 Obviously,
few of us are anxious to run across drunks in public, but there is a
substantial difference between being offended by a person's condi-
tion and being injured by his automobile. One who spends a morn-
ing in a municipal courtroom observing the parade of derelicts
stumbling through a succession of drying out sessions in jail and
desperate periods of freedom must question the efficacy of the whole
system, particularly in terms of deterrence.
In short, we retain a certain ambivalence. On the one hand, we
do not wish to impose a complete prohibition on consumption or
even make passive abuse a very serious crime. On the other hand,
we still insist on making public drunkenness a criminal offense, per-
haps because we object to the display of moral weakness.
Other forms of nonconstructive behavior also create similar
feelings of ambivalence. Some of the reasons for controlling gam-
bling are obvious and straightforward. Casino gambling is fre-
quently linked with the activities of organized crime. '  Yet
wagering on horse or dog races is no less gambling than black jack
or faro. Perhaps some emotional distinctions may be that the for-
mer activities are carried out in daylight (most of the time), outside
62. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-902.1, -903.1, -943 (1977); § 75-1027 (1979). It is
also illegal to sell alcoholic beverages on Sundays, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 48-904 (1977), and on
Christmas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 48-950 (1977), but not on days of other religious observances
which fall on other days of the week or year.
63. See general, Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
64. Smith, Showdown in Atantic City, 102 FORTUNE 72 (December 29, 1980).
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(sort of), and have more of the trappings of a sport (as opposed to a
game).
These are perhaps valid distinctions. But why are we uneasy
about gambling at all? Who is the victim? Perhaps in some in-
stances we wish to protect the individual from the professional gam-
bler. Largely, however, as with alcohol, we are primarily seeking to
protect the individual from his own indiscretions, from losing the
weekly paycheck at the crap table. Nevertheless, it may be our am-
bivalence in both areas which allows the system to work.
As with discrimination, if we chose to deal with gambling in a
legal way solely because it was morally offensive, the remedy would
be complete prohibition. Because we approach it functionally, the
result is compromise. After all, some gambling actually takes place
in churches as the 1981 bill attempting to make church bingo legal
recognized.65
Prostitution bears certain resemblances to prohibition and gam-
bling. As with drunkenness and compulsive gambling, the institu-
tion is unmistakably degrading in the eyes of most people; yet it is
not universally criminal, either as to prostitute or to customer.
There are some specific dangers posed by both the prostitute and the
customer, primarily the transmittal of venereal diseases. The other
supposed dangers are largely conjectural. While prostitution sup-
posedly undermines marriage and the home, the argument may be
made that it reduces the pressure on virtuous females to engage in
premarital sex, forcibly or otherwise. Nevada is currently experi-
menting with legalized prostitution.66 Apparently it is the only state
in the union to do so, although elsewhere there exists the same offi-
cial ambivalence toward prostitution as toward gambling and
alcohol.67
The use of marijuana and other "recreational" drugs poses still
other problems. Marijuana in particular has been analogized to al-
cohol, with attempts to distinguish responsible and irresponsible
use.68 Nevertheless, it is difficult to draw many parallels between
the use of marijuana and alcohol.
For example, although the medical effects of alcohol are fairly
65. S.B. 540, introduced in the 73rd General Assembly of the State of Arkansas, 1981,
was passed by both houses, but vetoed by Governor White.
66. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 201.380, .390, .410, .430, .440, 244.345 and 269.175 (1975).
67. L. KING, OF OUTLAWS, CON MEN, WHORES, POLITICIANS & OTHER ARTISTS
(1980). See especially "The Best Little Whorehouse in Texas," at 86-109.
68. Platform of the Libertarian Party, 1980. See also R. Raico, Civil Liberties, Liberta-
rian Party Position Paper No. 3 (1980).
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well known, particularly at low levels of consumption, we do not yet
know all there is to know about marijuana and chromosome dam-
age, or for that matter, about hallucinogenic drugs and personality
disorders. 69 We do know that marijuana has some legitimate medi-
cal uses, and its use in this regard may produce sufficient evidence to
70make intelligent legislative decisions.
We also know that addiction to hard drugs is debilitating and
can be directly linked to violent crime, and that the traffic in hard
drugs is a major mainstay of organized crime in the United States.
We know that society has to deal with the victims of addictive drugs,
although our experience with alcohol tells us that it does not do this
very well, even if injuries to third persons caused by an intoxicated
person fit relatively well within our traditional structures.
There may still be some room to argue that the use of mari-
juana is largely personal behavior in which the state has no substan-
tial or direct interest. It may even have less potential to create a
physical addiction than alcohol. However, it is difficult to make a
serious argument in this regard with reference to the use of hard
drugs and exotic hallucinogenics, which cannot be viewed as strictly
personal behavior, because of the strong link to criminal behavior
and dependency produced by physical debilitation.
Pornography perhaps poses more severe philosophical
problems. It is degrading like prostitution, prone to criminal in-
volvement like gambling, and yet controlling it poses problems simi-
lar to the prohibition of alcohol. Regulating pornography, like the
control of alcohol, requires distinctions between responsible use and
misuse.7
Of course, the central conflict in the area of pornography stems
from the fact that self-expression is constitutionally protected under
the first amendment. This has led to some rather absolutist posi-
tions. Mr. Justice Douglas, for example, believed that the courts are
simply incapable of making any intellectually responsible distinc-
tion between pronographic works and those in which sex is inciden-
tal to the author's major purpose.72
The real question is who is the victim. The continued high rat-
ings of the "Dallas" television show to the contrary, a substantial
number of people find pornography tedious, repetitive, and offen-
69. Marijuana Today, American Council on Marijuana (1980).
70. 1981 Ark. Acts 8.
71. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3502 (1977).
72. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN, 194-95 (1979).
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sive. They feel victimized by having to look at dirty movie ads in
the morning newspaper and listen to them on the radio, even though
they do not attend the movies. The mere presence of pornographic
material in the community causes them some discomfort. However,
this is a fairly remote and intangible i.nJury and one that is rather
dangerous to deal with since a number of non-sexual ideas are also
offensive to some people. The viewer or reader may arguably have
his or her taste or moral sensibilities abraded, but our legal system
tends to deal rather poorly with this sort of harm.
The problem is accentuated by the fact that public funds are
expended on many levels to purchase books. Choices must be
made, not only about which books should be bought, but about who
should make those decisions. The future problems may not yet be
fully appreciated. For years, libraries have not only checked out
printed volumes, but also phonograph records and more recently
tapes. With the advent of video cassettes and cassette players, the
day is not far off when libraries will maintain significant motion pic-
ture libraries. The arguments over Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer
may pale by comparison.
But even with the printed word, our courts have historically
had to try obscenity issues case by case in order to make decisions,73
which in itself suggests a high degree of cost-ineffectiveness. Society
may decide that the ends are worth the cost. In some instances, such
as protection of minors and restraint of public displays to unwilling
viewers, transaction costs may be relatively low. However, when the
harm is remote and the victim is the customer, the benefits are
questionable.
D. Specific Issues-Deviant Sexual Behavior
Sexual behavior is so undeniably personal and private that, as
the Griswold74 case points out, it has been an extremely difficult sub-
ject for a public instrument such as the law to deal with at all. This
has been especially true with deviant sexual behavior. There is a
general reluctance on the part of prosecutors and police officers to
spend very much time and effort hassling homosexuals.75
The original comprehensive Arkansas Criminal Code revision
in 1975 dropped the subject almost entirely, and it is significant that
the state's prosecuting attorneys had a very strong influence in draft-
73. See, e.g., Redrup v. New York, 384 U.S. 916 (1966).
74. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
75. Skolnick, Coercion to Virtue, 41 So. CAL. L. REV. 593 (1968).
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ing the Code. The prohibition against homosexual behavior was
placed back in the Code by action of the General Assembly, not the
original drafters.76 Again, if the activity is viewed as criminal, the
question becomes one of identifying harms and victims.
It is simply not possible to generalize by saying that the law has
always ,attached criminal penalties to behavior which offended pre-
vailing moral standards, even if no victim or identifiable harm were
involved. In this century, and in this state, the trend has certainly
been away from governmental compulsion based on such standards,
even in areas of high popular distaste.
In any event, it is difficult to view homosexuality as analogous
to heterosexual infidelity; people who are genuinely heterosexual
simply are not tempted to engage in homosexual activities merely
because they think they can get away with it. It may be practiced in
prison by persons who do not have a genuine homosexual orienta-
tion, but that is not a matter of choice.77
Recent research indicates that circumstances resulting in a ho-
mosexual orientation either occur or do not occur in a person's de-
velopment, and that the incidence of homosexuality is relatively
constant from generation to generation.78
Despite fears that the practice of homosexuality is rising, in all
probability what is happening is that a larger number of persons
who are in fact homosexual are taking less pains to conceal it than
before. The result is increased visibility of a higher number of non-
heterosexuals, rather than any actual numerical increase. In fact,
present public tolerance (acceptance is too strong a word) of homo-
sexuality appears feeble indeed when one considers the virtual glori-
fication of the condition during certain periods of history, notably
ancient Greece.79
Yet, homosexuality causes stresses in the legal system apart
from whether to treat it as criminal behavior. Should sexual orien-
tation be a suspect category, such as gender or race, with reference
to outlawing discrimination by government or by private parties? In
part, the theory behind the prohibitions on gender and race-based
discrimination is that these are conditions about which a person can
do absolutely nothing, and hence, discrimination is particularly in-
76. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1977).
77. See J. CHEEVER, FALCONER (1977).
78. See generally Durden-Smith, Male and Female-Why?, QUEST/80, 5 (October,
1980).
79. R. JENKYNS, THE VICTORIANS AND ANCIENT GREECE (1980).
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sidious.8° Religious discrimination is prohibited by the first amend-
ment and, perhaps more important, deals in matters of the spirit.
Denying a person a job based on his religious convictions essentially
gives economic considerations precedence over spiritual matters.
However, as basic as sexual behavior may be, it is neither a
permanent condition, such as gender or race, nor a spiritual matter.
It does not relate directly to constitutionally protected activities,
such as freedom of speech and political thought. Protecting behav-
ior which has no direct constitutional protection does represent a
departure from the traditional legal approach and does intrude into
personal preferences, although protective legislation in this regard is
rare and probably can be expected to remain so.
On the other hand, if the research is correct and sexual orienta-
tion is essentially developmental, regulating homosexual behavior
may simply be dealing with an outward manifestation of a condition
which is virtually as permanent as gender or race. Nevertheless, un-
til there is a showing that discrimination against non-heterosexuals
in private housing, public accommodations, and employment is a
significant economic problem for a substantial minority of the popu-
lation, protecting behavior which is not constitutionally recognized
in a positive sense, as opposed to status, would appear to be an un-
wise precedent. Such protection necessarily involves making a
value judgment concerning the behavior itself, rather than the indi-
vidual involved.
E. Specifc Issues-Abortion
Moral legislation itself then tends to fall into three broad cate-
gories: (a) encouragement of desired behavior, such as the blue
laws and flag-salutation situations, (b) regulation of self-destructive
activities, such as gambling, drinking, and drug use, and (c) sex.
As noted, prostitution does not produce significant social con-
flicts because there is a general attitude of disapproval, combined
with a certain ambivalence and tolerance which allows participation
by those who favor the practice. State-regulated gambling and alco-
hol consumption provide similar outlets. Drug use may be an enor-
mous problem, but not because of any conflict in basic values within
society as a whole. Even homosexuality is tolerated within limits,
perhaps because of an instinctive knowledge that it is not likely to
become widespread for simple biological reasons.
80. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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However, abortion deals not only with sexuality, but with the
beginnings of life itself. It was certainly inevitable that it would be-
come the focus for much of the controversy concerning personal
morality and the legitimate interests of the state.
Roe v. Wade8' attempted to fashion a compromise in line with
American legislative and judicial tradition. Starting with the ration-
ale of Griswold v. Connecticut, it reasoned that the first trimester of
pregnancy was so wholly private that substantive due process would
prohibit state interference. The second trimester warranted some
limited state overview. However, reviving some of the notions of
"viability," the Court viewed the third trimester as a period when
the fetus could conceivably live without its mother, hence justifying
its protection by the state.
However, Roe v. Wade, while striking a solution that seems rel-
atively practical, does not dispose of the basic issues. In fact, its use
of the concept of "potential" for life, as a corollary to its conclusion
that a fetus is not a "person" under the law, created a problem in
defining the state's interest in protecting that potentiality. In the
Hyde amendment cases,8 2 Mr. Justice Stewart found "protecting po-
tential human life" to be a legitimate governmental concern, 83 al-
though the fetus has historically not been regarded as "alive" or as a
"person" for other purposes. Causing a miscarriage may be a tort,
but the gravamen is not ordinarily wrongful death. Inducing abor-
tion may be criminal, but it is treated separately from murder in the
ordinary sense.8 4
The "potential" life approach may beg the question, an uneasy
compromise between two points of view. The first view, perhaps the
religious one, would consider the fetus as a human being from con-
ception. The other would consider a "potential" nothing more than
that, and certainly less than a person. For example, a fetus might be
thought of as a passenger on a ship immigrating to a particular
country. While he may be a "potential" citizen or resident of that
country who could ordinarily be expected to become such barring
interference, he is not treated as such until the potential is realized.
He is not protected by the laws of that country until he actually
arrives. If he is attacked or murdered on a non-flag vessel, the coun-
81. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For an excellent discussion of the analytical underpinnings of
Mr. Justice Blackmun's decision in this area, see Fuqua, Justice Harry 4. Blackmun: The
Abortion Decision, 34 ARK. L. REV. 276 (1980).
82. Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
83. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
84. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2551 (1977).
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try of his destination assumes no jurisdiction based solely upon his
potential citizenship or residency. In this view, viability may have
only slight relevance. It is not critical medically anyway, because
the vast majority of abortions (induced and spontaneous) occur dur-
ing the first trimester, before viability.8 5
Analogy to euthanasia is not very helpful. Euthanasia plainly
does not involve a mere potentiality-unlike the immigrant, the pas-
senger has "arrived." And care of the elderly can be transferred.
Under present technology, pregnancy is non-transferrable---only its
mother can carry and keep alive a fetus. Further, although it takes
two persons to conceive the fetus, only one is forced to carry it.
It is equally inescapable that (1) sexual activity without some
responsibility for the procreative results is not in itself a basic legal
right in an affirmative sense,86 and that (2) the potential to become
a human being is plainly there. From the moment of conception,
barring interruption of the pregnancy by biological or conscious de-
cision, the potential is there to become a specific, genetically-recog-
nizable human being. It is difficult to suggest that there are no
serious moral questions with regard to abortion, or that the area
should somehow be circumscribed and any ethical discussion
eliminated.
It is also difficult to suggest that those questions are not differ-
ent with every single potential abortion. It may be more comforta-
ble to adopt a single answer for every situation, but distinctions are
widely accepted between abortion in connection with rape, incest,
and threats to life or health and abortion for mere convenience.
It may be argued that the ethical issue is one of individual re-
sponsibility when dealing with something as serious as the potential
for human life. Couples may act in an entirely responsible and cau-
tious manner, yet still be faced with an unwanted pregnancy.
Surely, there is a moral distinction between this situation and a mere
unwillingness to be bothered with birth control.
Additionally, biology cannot be ignored. At least one out of
every six pregnancies results in spontaneous abortion.8 7 (As for
public attitudes, it is difficult to imagine that any advanced country
would accept an infant mortality rate that high, yet we are seem-
ingly not disturbed at all by the other statistic.) In most instances,
the body determines that it simply should not carry the fetus to term
85. M. FISHBEIN, MEDICAL & HEALTH ENCYCLOPEDIA 32 (1964).
86. 34 ARK. L. REV. 276, 289 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2554 (1977).
87. M. FISHBEIN, supra note 85.
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because it is defective, because the mother is not strong enough, or
because similar medical reasons are present. Should individuals be
precluded from making the same sort of decisions, on a conscious
basis-for example, when the pregnancy is an unexpected one in a
woman whose age makes brain damage to the infant highly proba-
ble? The problem becomes more acute as technology enables expec-
tant parents to know with considerable accuracy the health
prospects of their unborn child.88
In terms of medical ethics, what are the problems with prolong-
ing and seeking to bring to term a pregnancy which the body itself
would have decided (absent medical interference) to terminate?89
The implications of the latter question are profound and are not
only far beyond the scope of this essay, but beyond the abilities of
the law to resolve. Self-righteousness on either side of the issue cer-
tainly obscures this point.
F. Traditional Resolutions
The answer to the problem of preventing this sort of societal
harm is private, personal. education. The solution is persuasion, not
public, legal compulsion. For example, we may believe that it is
immoral to bring children into the world and deny them love and
attention, even if their physical needs are met. Yet, the state does
not prescribe minimum standards of caring. We may be appalled at
persons who place parents or handicapped children in institutions to
meet their physical needs, and then ignore them, yet the state does
not dictate a minimum number of visits. 90 While we may attempt to
enforce the Biblical injunctions against activities such as killing, the
law is simply not an effective instrument for mandating honor for
fathers and mothers. As Dean Pound observes, the law is limited by
"the intangibleness of duties which morally are of great moment but
legally defy enforcement."'
Roe v. Wade92 is a striking example of a central American legal
tradition, which is also inherent in our statutory approach to alco-
hol, gambling, and, to some extent, drug use, and consistent with
our actual treatment of prostitution and pornography. That tradi-
tion has been to avoid an absolutist position where personal judg-
88. Chedd, Who Shall Be Born?, SCIENCE 81, 32, January/February, 1981.
89. See When Doctors Play God, NEWSWEEK, August 31, 1981, at 48.
90. See G. Will,,4 Trip Toward Death, NEWSWEEK, August 31, 1981, at 72, dealing with
an institutionalized child suffering from Down's syndrome.
91. Pound, supra note 7.
92. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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ments are concerned, but to structure or even contrive methods on a
pragmatic basis to protect third persons, while insuring individual
freedom from governmental compulsion. It is a tradition to be ap-
preciated and protected.
VI. CONCLUSION
Attitudes toward transfer payments-how much, to whom, and
if at all-vary widely. Such attitudes may be influenced by the
party in power, and that party obviously may make a significant
difference in the answers to these types of questions. Shifts in this
regard occur as an established part of our political process. Ordina-
rily the shifts do not result in judgments about who is "deserving" of
the benefits in an individualized way (despite such terms as "truly
needy" and more recently "dependent poor"). Similarly, regulation
of economic activity allows wide elasticity without fundamental
structural damage.
In both instances, criteria are established in light of some per-
ceived societal purpose such as relieving hunger or promoting eco-
nomic growth. The intended result is usually to improve the whole
society, even if the policies themselves may be radically different.
The taxing mechanism is in this regard an enormous contrivance,
almost wholly artificial, with inherent powers and purposes which
extend far beyond the simple collection of money.
These shifts in transfer payments and regulatory zeal, however,
impinge on personal ethical decisions only peripherally, if at all.
The law does not handle moral questions well, and our experience
and case law generally tell us to leave them alone, whether we are
trying to encourage patriotism through compulsory flag salutes, 93 to
discourage profligacy by limiting opportunities for gambling, or to
promote conventional morality by proscribing certain sexual
practices.
We have discovered, sometimes painfully, that we are better off
distinguishing subversion from indifference, public lewdness from
private consent, and drunken driving from the two-martini lunch.
We can distinguish tolerating behavior which does not involve third
parties and sanctioning that behavior because we have learned that
dealing with private behavior can be highly cost-ineffective.
We can use our experience to judge legislation of all types by a
four-part test:
93. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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1. Is the genera/purpose of the legislation to achieve a spe-
cific result with reference to the functions of society as a whole
(especially in terms of economics or governmental mechanics)?
Or is the purpose to promote a particular moral or religious
notion?
2. Does that notion or purpose allow compromise? Or does
it assume an absolute position or value judgment?
3. Is the restriction on behavior aimed at protecting a spe-
cific right of another person? Or aimed simply at the behavior
itself?
4. Is the purpose to be achieved by encouraging or discour-
aging particular personal behavior? Or by compelling orprohibit-
ing certain personal behavior?
If the principal aim is to promote a particular moral notion, the
legislation should be closely examined in terms of prospects for ac-
ceptance and justifiable transactional costs. If the victim is hard to
identify and the restriction substantial, closer scrutiny is justified. If
the only identifiable victim is the perpetrator, the legislation should
be considered seriously deficient.
Further, in protecting a right granted by legislation in a non-
criminal setting, our tradition has rightfully been biased in favor of
private enforcement. A legislative scheme which grants rights
should also provide the mechanism for vindicating those rights in a
meaningful, functional sense without peripheral value judgments.
This four-part analysis seeks consistency and stability rather
than preconceived ideological results. The general discussion of
various categories of laws suggests certain enactments which would
be at least suspect under this approach. A detailed (but not exhaus-
tive) listing might include:
a. Compulsory school attendance laws;
b. Mandatory sex education without a meaningful opt-out
mechanism;
c. Sunday closing laws;
d. Laws regulating private, adult sexual behavior of all
kinds;
e. Mandatory school prayer, with or without opt-out mech-
anisms-that is, a government mandate that a certain time will
be set aside for the opportunity for prayer in public schools;
f. Laws preempting personal decisions with reference to




g. Governmental enforcement of equal employment op-
portunity cases;
h. Laws protecting personal behavior, as opposed to condi-
tion or belief;
i. Laws requiring or prohibiting the teaching of a particu-
lar subject or theory, such as Arkansas' creation-science law,
which was admitted by its author to be religiously inspired;95
j. Group libel laws.
Instead of approaching the law with preconceived political no-
tions, we should try to analyze just what we are seeking to accom-
plish and the manner in which we are molding the law to those
ends. We may find the results surprising and disturbing.
The same questions may not even always produce the same an-
swers, as when evolving technology shifts cost-effectiveness calcula-
tions radically. For example, transfer of a fertilized ovum from one
cow to another, which then bears the calf, is now a technical possi-
bility. If such a procedure with human beings were to become as
simple and as safe as a medically-supervised abortion, plainly the
mother contemplating an abortion would be placed in a significantly
different moral context than at present. The legal context would
also be shifted radically, and the situation would begin to look very
much like Justice Blackmun's third trimester, perhaps even from
conception. One does not have to accept the idea of "situation eth-
ics" to conclude that functionalism in the law produces no more ab-
solutes than moralism, but does require periodic adjustments in
response to changing contexts.
As Dean Pound suggests, the law has always been an instru-
ment for enforcing particular views of society, and this century has
witnessed the stresses and tensions of strongly different visions of
the function of the law. However, the genius of American jurispru-
dence has lain in what may be termed its Augustinian tradition-its
focus on functionality rather than ideology; its assumption of com-
promise and flexibility; its self-restriction to the ethical minimum
described by Dean Pound; and a disinclination to compel or pro-
hibit personal behavior.
The four-part test proposed by this essay does suggest answers
to the four questions posed in its introductory passages. There has
94. H.B. 472 was introduced in the 73rd General Assembly of the State of Arkansas. It
was referred to an interim committee.
95. See note 1 supra.
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indeed been a trend toward increased transfer payments and entitle-
ments, as a part of the liberal social agenda, yet this trend (and its
apparent current reversal) represent a part of our traditional polit-
ical process, and neither is a departure from it. The ebbs and flows
of regulation of economic activity may be similarly classified.
Whether this particular agenda was or is appropriate, it simply
has not involved significant compulsion of personal behavior. The
attempts to reverse the substance of Roe v. Wade and to otherwise
permit greater governmental latitude in regulating personal behav-
ior do represent a conflict with traditional American functions of the
law. There are fundamental, non-political differences between these
types of legislation, and to argue that one is simply the political op-
posite of the other is to ignore history and embrace superficiality.
The four-part test is intended as an objective tool for analyzing
legislative proposals, past and present, to determine their compati-
bility with that American, Augustinian tradition, and as a guide to
lead us away from legislation-whatever its ideological origin-
which departs from that tradition.
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